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Introduction
The modern economic theory of law enforcement stems from Becker's (1968) seminal paper.
The key message is that the implementation of legal rules changes the economic incentives for illegal practices and the main concern is how society should channel incentives to arrive at an e¢ cient deterrence of such practices. This requires deterring crime only when it is e¢ cient to do so and implementing enforcement in the most cost e¤ective way. Antitrust regulation to deter cartels incorporated the issue of sustainable concerted illegal activities by several o¤enders.
1 Most of the current literature, however, is rather silent on how to integrate legal principles into the economic analysis. Becker's original analysis suggests a simple rule: Deter crime only when the harm it causes is greater than the bene…t accruing to the o¤ender, and to do it by setting the …ne and the probability of conviction so that the expected penalty just equals the o¤ender's bene…t. 3 As this theory takes the view that increasing the rate of law enforcement entails positive social costs, while …nes are socially costless, the optimal law enforcement for cartels dictates to set …nes to the maximum level in order to save on inspection costs. An adaptation of this rule to antitrust law enforcement is provided by Landes (1983) . In the case of cartels, bene…t consists of the additional collusive pro…ts plus any cost saving and quality improvement the coordinated practice may generate, net of any cost of enforcement, while harm consists of the consumer surplus transferred to …rms in the form of collusive pro…ts plus the utility of 1 See, for example, Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 . 2 Notable exceptions include Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) or Cooter and Ulen (2007) . 3 Risk aversion and legal errors could reduce the optimal …ne, see e.g. Garoupa (1997 Garoupa ( , 2001 ), Polinsky and Shavell (1984 , 2000 . the foregone consumption due to the higher price, i.e., the deadweight loss. It has been argued by many researchers, such as Werden and Simon (1987) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) , that the cartel's bene…t from price-…xing is smaller than the harm it causes and that there are no such collusive infringements that may enhance social welfare. Hence, according to this simple rule, the e¢ cient expected …ne should be set at the lowest level that deters all possible cartels or all possible collusive prices and to set …nes to the maximum level in order to save on inspection costs. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) argue that this simple policy prescription is too much in contrast with current practices of antitrust law enforcement in both the US and the EU.
First, legislation sets restrictive ceilings to the maximum applicable …ne due to bankruptcy considerations. Second, an important legal principle is that punishments should be based on the gravity of the o¤ense in order to re ‡ect society's harm and illegal gains. For antitrust, the legislation attempts to relate the …ne to a rough measure of gravity that is approximated by the cartel's illegal gains in the US and by the cartel overcharge in the EU. These gravity measures aim to capture the consequences of cartel behavior for the colluding …rms and their victims. Third, an equally important legal principle is the principle of proportionality; the regulator should not take any action that exceeds the one which is just necessary to achieve the objective (see Fish, 2008) . In terms of the …ne structures, this principle implies that the …ne should not be in excess of the lowest …ne that su¢ ces to prevent criminal activities.
Ceilings on antitrust …nes have been analyzed by Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) and Wils (2007) . They argue that the ceilings on antitrust …nes in both the US and the EU are insu¢ cient to deter cartels. The ceiling makes antitrust policies either completely ine¤ective, such that the cartel can sustain all prices including the monopoly price, or at best partially e¤ective but in such a way that only low prices are deterred, but the high prices are still sustainable by the cartel. This raises the issue whether such negative result is inevitable in the presence of legal ceilings on …nes.
One of our main contributions is to revise previous policy prescriptions for an extension of the model in Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) in which the above legal principles are accounted for. In our model, the price is a continuous variable that is set strategically by the cartel to maximize its pro…t given the antitrust enforcement. Antitrust enforcement is endogenous and it is set strategically so that social welfare is maximized while obeying the legal principles. Technically speaking, the …ne structure is a function of the cartel price and other parameters of the model. Optimizing over the space of all feasible …ne schedules is a challenging mathematical problem that we solve by sound economic reasoning alone without the need of complicated mathematics.
Our major result is that even in the presence of legal ceilings, it is possible to design a more e¤ective …ne structure that is welfare improving when compared to the policy prescriptions currently available in the literature. We demonstrate this by constructing the most e¤ective optimal …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles. This …ne schedule induces the lowest cartel price that is optimal for the cartel and, hence, reduces the dead-weight loss to its lowest achievable level. This improvement is achieved by making collusion on lower prices more attractive than collusion on higher prices. This result and the derived optimal …ne schedule can be related to the literature on marginal deterrence by Stigler (1971 ), Shavell (1992 , and Wilde (1992) . Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) analyze individual o¤enders and only two illegal acts under a constant legal upper bound. They derive that the …ne for a more harmful o¤ence should be set equal to the legal upper bound, while less harmful crime should receive a lower punishment. This …ne schedule induces o¤enders to choose the least harmful act. Our analysis shows how to generalize the results of Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) to the case of a non-constant legal upper bound and group violations with multiple concerted illegal actions in the context of antitrust enforcement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the legal principles and how we implement them. Section 3 outlines the model. The optimal …ne schedule is derived in Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
Legal Principles of Antitrust
Current legislations in the US and EU restrict …nes based on legal and economical principles such as punishments should …t the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum …nes. In this section, we discuss these four principles and how to incorporate them into our analysis.
Punishments Fit the Crime: Antitrust guidelines in the US and EU are founded on the legal principle that punishment should …t the crime, see DOJ (2010) and EC (2006) .
In practice, this principle translates into higher …nes for higher-gravity o¤enses. Generally speaking, the gravity of an o¤ence is related to both the harm caused by the o¤ense and the cartel's illegal gains. In the US, the gravity is measured by the cartel's illegal gains, while in the EU, it is approximated by the cartel overcharge.
Principle of Proportionality: An important principle of current legislation is the principle of proportionality that states that regulators should not take any action that exceeds the one which is just su¢ cient to achieve the same outcome, see e.g. Fish (2008) . Interpreting this principle in terms of the …ne structure, it requires that the …ne should not be more than the lowest possible …ne that would induce the same market outcome. If …nes are considered to be socially costless, there is no reason to adopt this principle. However, excessive …nes may amplify the possible negative impact of antitrust enforcement, which can stem from unobservable legal errors. Hence, the rationale for adopting the principle of proportionality is to minimize any potential undesirable impact of the antitrust policy.
Bankruptcy Considerations: Both the US and EU legislation impose ceilings on …nes.
These ceilings are justi…ed on the ground that legislators do not want to jeopardize the …nancial stability of the o¤ending …rms. Besides employment considerations, high …nes that cause bankruptcy are against the ultimate goal of antitrust law because such high …nes would reduce the number of active competitors in the market.
In the EU, …nes are limited up to 10% of overall total annual turnover, see EC (2006) .
Total turnover is indirectly related to the illegal gains or price-markups in the markets corrupted by cartel agreements, because it consists of the total sales over all the product markets in which the company operates, while only some of these markets may be involved in the collusive agreement. There is no formal legal upper bound on the antitrust …nes in the US. However, in many cases, such as the UCAR 1993 case, …nes were reduced due to …rms'inability to pay. In such a setting, the existence of an implicit ceiling on …nes, which is determined by the …rms'limited liability, can be argued.
Minimum Fines: According to the current sentencing guidelines in the US, the base …ne can be zero for some mild o¤enses, see DOJ (2010) . Moreover, rewarding …rms that violate antitrust law is not possible according to the current rules both in the US and the EU. This indicates that imposing no or a zero …ne has to be regarded as the minimum …ne.
Modelling Legal Antitrust Principles:
We analyze …nes that satisfy the legal principles listed above in an oligopoly model of price competition. Current antitrust legislation relates the …ne to a measure of gravity that is approximated by the cartel's illegal gains or by the cartel overcharge. 4 Because both cartel's illegal gains and overcharge are positively related to the relevant cartel price, we model the …ne schedule as a function of cartel price to accommodate the current practice in the US and EU. As in Becker (1968) and Posner (1976) , the optimal antitrust enforcement consists of a …ne schedule and e¤ort level of inspection and prosecution that maximize the social welfare. In addition, the …ne schedule must satisfy the four principles discussed above.
The bankruptcy considerations and the minimum …nes impose upper and lower bounds on the …ne schedule. The upper bound is a given function of the cartel price in order to capture current guidelines in the US and EU. By doing so, our approach accommodates for the three main interpretations of the current guidelines: a constant upper bound, a percentage of annual overall turnover, and bounds related to the cartel's illegal gains. With respect to the minimum …ne, the …ne schedule is bounded by a legal lower bound in order to capture the feature that rewards are not allowed in the current guidelines in the US and EU.
The principle that punishment should …t the crime implies that a higher cartel price should cause a higher …ne. In other words, the …ne schedule should be non-decreasing in order to incorporate the possibility that a range of mild o¤enses are not …ned. The legal principle of proportionality requires that the …ne should be kept to the minimum that is just necessary to induce the best social outcome within the domain of …ne schedules that satisfy the other three principles.
The Model
Consider an in…nitely-repeated oligopoly model with discounting in the presence of antitrust enforcement. Given the probability to be detected and the …ne structure, if the …rms collude, they will be detected probabilistically and …ned according to the …ne structure. We study a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of this repeated game model where the cartel maximizes its present value of the stream of pro…ts under the antitrust policy that satis…es the four legal principles discussed in the previous section.
In every period, n 2 …rms compete in a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly model. Antitrust enforcement consists of the antitrust authority's (AA) e¤ort level to detect and prosecute the cartel and a …ne structure. A higher e¤ort of detection/prosecution leads to a higher probability to detect the cartel, but associates with a higher cost. Due to limited resources of the AA, assume that the probability to detect the cartel is given by 2 [0; 1).
Note that = 0 is equivalent to a situation with no antitrust enforcement.
The …ne structure is modeled as a function of the cartel price. If the …rms are found guilty of sustaining cartel price p 2 (p N ; p M ], then every …rm will have to pay the one-time …ne (p). Here we maintain the speci…cation of Rey (2003) that only misconduct in the current period is prosecuted. The …ne schedule ( ) is a function of p that obeys the four legal principles discussed in the previous section. It is continuous, nondecreasing, satis…es proportionality, and the legal upper and lower bounds. The legal upper bound ( ) is assumed to be continuous and nondecreasing in p.
The legal principle of proportionality requires some explanation. A …ne schedule that is limited by an insu¢ cient legal upper bound is ine¤ective to deter some cartel prices and, hence, the cartel will form. Given and ( ), the cartel will choose the optimal cartel price that maximizes the present value of its member's pro…t with discount factor 2 (0; 1). The …ne schedule ( ) satis…es the legal principle of proportionality if there does not exist another …ne schedule^ ( ) ( ) such that^ ( ) induces the same optimal cartel price as ( ) does.
This class of …ne schedules accommodates the current practice of …nes that are related to either the illegal pro…ts or cartel overcharge through the gravity of the o¤ence as described in OECD (2002), EC (2006), and DOJ (2010) .
Observe that the static Nash equilibrium price p N is always sustainable by subgame perfect equilibrium for all 2 (0; 1), which is also the …rst-best outcome in the model outlined above. We now discuss a stationary subgame perfect equilibria supported by the following modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le in the presence of antitrust enforcement: The …rms collude at price p > p N in the …rst period and continue to set price p as long as no …rm deviates from the cartel price p. Any price deviation by some of the …rms will lead to the static Nash equilibrium price p N in every period thereafter. The behavior after any deviation re ‡ects a permanent breakdown of trust among the …rms, and without trust, the …rms will not be able to form a cartel anymore. As in Motta and Polo (2003) , here we assume that the cartel will continue every time it is detected and …ned. Alternatively, Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 and Houba, Motchenkova, and Wen (2012) consider situations where the cartel will dissolve with either certainty or some probability each time it is detected. Assuming the cartel will reestablish after each time it is detected is consistent with the cartel's pro…t-maximizing behavior. It is worthwhile to point out that how the cartel behaves after it is detected does not change the qualitative aspect of our analysis and results.
Let v(p; ) be the present value of a …rm's expected pro…t from the above strategy pro…le.
It equals the current illegal net pro…ts (p), minus the expected …ne (p), plus the expected continuation value v(p; ). Solving for v(p; ) yields the following pro…t function for every cartel member:
As in Motta and Polo (2003) , price-deviating …rms will not be prosecuted. 6 Given the modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le, the pro…t of any …rm from a unilateral deviation is equal to the short-term net gain opt (p) in the current period, minus an expected …ne of zero (no prosecution), plus the normalized pro…t from p N forever. The necessary and su¢ cient condition to support cartel price p 2 p N ; p M by a subgame perfect equilibrium is
An optimal cartel price maximizes the present value of each …rm's expected pro…t and the 6 Alternative assumptions such as the possibility of prosecuting price-deviating …rms would only relax the equilibrium condition for collusion to be sustainable. Hence, our results will not qualitatively change if such alternative assumption were imposed. set of optimal cartel prices is
Observe that a lower cartel price implies a lower deadweight loss, or a higher social welfare.
Hence, our objective is to identify the optimal …ne schedule that induces the lowest optimal cartel price in the class of …ne schedules that satisfy the four legal principles. The design of the optimal …ne schedule takes into account the optimal reaction by the cartel to the antitrust enforcement.
The Optimal Fine Schedule
In this section, we will characterize the optimal …ne schedule in the following three steps.
First, we identify the pro…t level the cartel can guarantee to each …rm when facing any …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles. Second, given the legal lower bound of a …ne schedule, we derive the lowest possible cartel price at which each …rm receives the minmax pro…t we identi…ed in step one. Lastly, we provide a …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles and induces the minimal cartel price. We will show that this …ne schedule is the lowest …ne schedule that also induces this minimal cartel price, and it is the optimal …ne schedule.
The Minmax Cartel Pro…t
The rationale of the Beckerian tradition is that the expected loss of being punished should outweigh the expected bene…t of committing the crime, see e.g., Becker (1968 ) or Posner (1976 . The condition of marginal deterrence in Stigler (1970) states that the marginal bene…t of an illegal activity should be equal to the marginal expected …ne to deter such an activity. In its most elementary form, this suggests (p) (p) in our antitrust enforcement problem, where the Beckerian tradition and Stigler's marginal deterrence are equivalent. If the AA were able to set the …ne high enough, such as (p) > 1 (p) for all p > p N , it would be unpro…table for the …rms to collude because equilibrium condition (2) fails for all p > p N . Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) and Wils (2007) , however, point out that the current inspection e¤orts and the existing upper bounds on …nes in both the US and EU are insu¢ -cient to deter cartels. This suggests that the existing legal upper bound (p) not only fails the Beckerian structure but also is not high enough to deter cartel formation so that
for some p 2 (p N ; p M ]. Accordingly, we assume that the exogenous legal upper bound (p)
satis…es (4), so that any …ne schedule (p) bounded by the legal upper bound (p) is also insu¢ cient to deter all cartel prices.
Recall that we are searching for the optimal …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles, including the legal upper bound. For any …ne schedule (p) (p), observe that
which implies that such p can also be sustained as a cartel price when the …ne schedule (p)
is imposed. Inequality (5) also implies that if the …rms set the corresponding optimal cartel price, each cartel member receives no less when facing (p) than when facing the upper legal bound (p). In other words, when facing a …ne schedule that obeys the legal upper bound, each cartel member should receive at least what it can receive when facing the legal upper bound and setting the corresponding optimal cartel price.
Proposition 1 For all …ne schedules ( ) ( ), we have
Proof. Take any optimal cartel price when facing the …ne schedule ( ),
, so p C can also be sustained as a cartel price if the …ne schedule is (p). Note that the left-hand side of (6) is greater than or equal to v(p C ; ) v(p C ; ), which is the right-hand side of (6).
In fact, the right-hand side of (6) is at least what the cartel can guarantee each member when facing any function that obeys the legal upper bound. It plays an important role in …nding the optimal …ne schedule. Accordingly, we denote this minmax cartel pro…t as
Under the legal upper bound ( ), the condition for sustainable cartel prices requires that v ; opt ( ). Figure 1 illustrates both v ; and opt ( ), together with the range of sustainable cartel prices between the square brackets on the price axis. Under the legal upper bound ( ), the cartel sets an optimal cartel price p in this range and each …rm obtains v .
The minmax cartel pro…t v plays a prominent role in determining the optimal …ne schedule. It can be viewed as the cartel's security level or the lowest maximal cartel pro…t for all …ne schedules that are bounded by the legal upper bound. More speci…cally, for any …ne schedule ( ) that is bounded by the legal upper bound ( ), a …rm's pro…t v ( ; ) is always bounded from below by v ; . Because opt ( ) does not depend on the …ne schedule, any cartel price under the legal upper bound, such as p C ( ), can also be sustained as a cartel price under such a …ne schedule ( ). Therefore, under …ne schedule ( ) ( ), the cartel is able to obtain at least as v by setting price at p :
In general, however, each …rm may receive more than v when facing a …ne schedule that is less than the legal upper bound.
The Minimal Cartel Price
Imposing the legal upper bound will certainly induce the minmax cartel pro…t v to every …rm. However, given that it is impossible to prevent the cartel under the legal upper bound, the objective of antitrust enforcement is not to minimize the cartel pro…t, but rather to minimize the harm caused by the cartel. Given a …ne schedule must also satis…es the three other
Figure 1: The minmax cartel pro…t v and the optimal cartel price p legal principles, the question is how to minimize the harm caused by the cartel given that each …rm must receive a pro…t that is at least the minmax cartel pro…t. In this subsection, we identity this achievable minimal cartel price.
Recall the value function (1) and any …ne schedule must also be bounded from below by some exogenous legal lower bound, normalized to be zero. For (p) 0, we have
Proposition 1 asserts that no matter what …ne is imposed, the optimal cartel pro…t is at least v . Therefore, in order for any p 2 (p N ; p M ] to be a possible optimal cartel price, it must be the case that . Therefore, given the constraint that ( ) 0, the cartel must set its price equal top or above in order to ensure each member's pro…t is at least the minmax cartel pro…t v . Now we argue that suchp can be sustained as a cartel price if (p) = 0. Observe
where the last inequality is due to (7). Because (p ) 0, the monotonicity of ( ) implies that (p) (p ), which in turn implies thatp p . Due to the assumption that opt ( ) is also monotonically increasing, (9) implies that
which means thatp can be sustained as a cartel price. In fact,p is the lowest possible optimal cartel price when the …rms face any …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles. For this reason, we callp the minimal cartel price. This result is formally presented as Proposition 2 For any …ne schedule ( ) that satis…es the four legal principles, any optimal cartel price is bounded from below by the minimal cartel pricep = 1 ((1 )v ):
Built upon Figure 1 , Figure 2 illustrates how the minimal cartel price is determined by the minmax cartel pro…t. Recall that minmax cartel pro…t v is the maximal cartel pro…t when the legal upper bound ( ) is imposed. Given the monotonicity of pro…t function v(p; 0) = (p)=(1 ), the minimal cartel price is the one at which each …rm receives exactly the minmax cartel pro…t when the legal lower bound 0 is imposed. For simplicity, we choose not to illustrate the equilibrium condition as we have shown that if (p) = 0, the minimal cartel pricep can be sustained as an equilibrium price by the modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le.
In searching for the optimal …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles where the legal upper bound is insu¢ cient to deter cartel activity, the objective of antitrust enforcement should shift to minimize the harm caused by the cartel. This translates into minimization of the optimal cartel price in order to take into account the cartel's response to the …ne schedule set. Proposition 2 shows that within the class of …ne schedules considered, it is impossible to reduce the cartel price below the minimal cartel price. Now the question is whether it is feasible to induce this minimal cartel price with a …ne schedule that not only satis…es the upper and lower bounds, but also the monotonicity and, more importantly, the proportionality. If such a …ne schedule exists and indeed induces the minimal cartel price, it is the optimal …ne schedule under the four restrictions imposed by the legal rules and conventions.
Characterization of the Optimal Fine Schedule
We now derive a …ne schedule under which the minimal cartel price is an optimal cartel price.
As we have argued, such a …ne schedule induces the lowest possible optimal cartel price that is the second-best outcome given that the cartel cannot be completely prevented due to the legal upper bound on …ne schedules. Hence, the …ne schedule we derive is indeed the optimal …ne schedule. In doing so, we utilize all four legal principles, namely monotonicity, lower and upper legal bounds, and proportionality.
In order to achieve the minimal cartel pricep, it is necessary that it can be sustained as a cartel price and that each …rm receives the minmax cartel pro…t v . This requires that the …ne should be set to 0 when the …rms collude at the minimal cartel pricep. Because the …ne schedule must satisfy monotonicity and the legal lower bound of 0, we conclude that (p) = 0
. For this range of prices, whether they can be sustained as cartel prices or not, monotonicity and the legal lower bound are binding in determining the optimal …ne schedule.
Next consider the price range (p; p M ]. If the legal upper bound ( ) were imposed, the cartel would receive at most a pro…t of v by selecting a cartel price p 2 (p; p M ]. Given the minmax cartel pro…t v from setting the price at the minimal cartel pricep, the necessary and su¢ cient condition forp to be an optimal cartel price is that for all p 2 (p;
Condition (10) asserts that either p can be sustained as a cartel price but each …rm does not receive more pro…t than v , or p cannot be sustained at all. Rewriting (10) yields
The legal principle of proportionality requires that the …ne is just high enough to reduce the cartel pro…t either to v for any p 2 (p; p M ], or to upset the equilibrium condition (2).
Moreover, in order to obey this principle we need to identify the minimum of these two right-hand sides. This yields two cases in (11) depending whether
This distinction can be related to the level of the legal upper bound ( ). In case the legal upper bound is relatively low, v is relatively high and we have opt (p M ) v . The optimal cartel price is then solely driven by the minmax pro…t level, and breaking cartel sustainability is irrelevant in the determination of the optimal …ne schedule, which is re ‡ected by the fact that all cartel prices are sustainable. In the other case, the legal upper bound is relatively high, v is relatively low and we have opt (p M ) > v . Then, the sustainability condition also plays a key role in the determination of the optimal …ne schedule. We treat the …rst case in this section, derive the corresponding optimal …ne schedule, and utilize it to illustrate our main results and contributions to the literature, and the policy implications. The analysis of the second case has similar policy implications, however, it involves technical complications related to existence of the optimal …ne schedule on some intervals of prices. For that reason,
we postpone the analysis of this case to the Appendix.
In the remainder of this section, we consider that case of Figure 3 .
Proposition 3 When opt (p M ) v , the optimal …ne schedule is given bŷ
Proof. Because (p) = (1 )v by Proposition 2, we have
hence,^ ( ) in (12) is monotonic and continuous. From the construction, we know that such a …ne schedule obeys the legal lower and upper bounds. Notice that at p 2 [p; p M ], the optimal …ne^ (p ) is equal to the legal upper bound (p ). If^ ( ) is imposed, the minimal cartel pricep is an optimal cartel price because any other price either cannot be sustained as a cartel price or each …rm will receive at most the minmax cartel pro…t.
Recall that in the presence of the legal upper bound the …rst-best …ne schedule is infeasible and antitrust enforcement is insu¢ cient to deter cartel activity. In this case, some cartel prices can be sustained by the cartel and society incurs a deadweight loss. The important question is how to keep the deadweight loss minimal given the legal upper bound. According to Proposition 3, the e¤ectiveness of the …ne schedule in reducing the optimal cartel price can be maximally improved by adapting …ne schedule (12). Figure 3 illustrates that this …ne schedule satis…es all four legal principles. Within this class of …ne schedules, it is the only one that achieves the smallest attainable optimal cartel pricep. Fine schedule (12) induces the cartel to setp as its optimal cartel price. This price lies strictly between the Nash equilibrium price p N and the optimal cartel price p when the legal upper bound is imposed. This reduces the deadweight loss caused by the cartel.
The maximal reduction of the optimal cartel price is achieved by making all prices in the range betweenp and p M as attractive as p by reducing the …ne below the legal upper bound.
Moreover, …ne schedule (12) does not punish mild o¤ences of collusion on cartel prices beloŵ p. This result supports the procedure of determination of the base …ne in the current US sentencing guidelines, see DOJ (2010) , where o¤ences of mild gravity would be assigned a base …ne of zero. Note that the value function under^ ( ) is given by
which is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Proposition 3 describes the unique SPE outcome supported by the modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le. Even if some prices above the minimal cartel pricep can be sustained by the cartel, they are all optimal in the sense that these yield the same pro…t v to the cartel.
In this equilibrium, the cartel selects the smallest optimal cartel price. There are practical reason why the cartel may prefer to choose this smallest optimal cartel price, such as increase
Figure 4: The value function v(p;^ ) under the optimal …ne^ (p).
in the popularity of the product. Furthermore, if the cartel does not choose this smallest optimal cartel price, the AA would have an incentive to increase the …ne slightly higher than (p) for any price p >p, so that the cartel would not choose such price p >p.
For the case of a di¤erentiable pro…t function, the optimal …ne schedule for cartel prices in the upper/second range satis…es the condition of marginal deterrence in Stigler (1970) that states that the marginal bene…t of the o¤ense should be equal its marginal expected cost. Even in the absence of di¤erentiability, marginal deterrence holds in the following sense. The cartel has no incentive to set a price in the lower range of prices because the present value of pro…ts for each individual …rm is strictly increasing in the cartel price on this range due to the zero …ne. Also, this present value is less than the security level and, hence, these cartel prices are not optimal.
These insights also relate to the results in Block, Nold, and Sidak (1981) where the design of the optimal (di¤erentiable) …ne schedule should be such that the condition of marginal deterrence is achieved on p N ; p M . Application of their ideas to our setting would imply that the optimal …ne schedule solves the di¤erential equation
In case the di¤erential equation would also be solved for p 2 p N ;p , it violates the legal lower bound. Stigler (1970) and Block, Nold, and Sidaket (1981) are silent on the issue of sustainability of concerted illegal actions and, hence, our results generalize their analysis to include such concerted actions. In addition, we also extend the analysis to nondi¤erentiable pro…t functions and nonconstant legal upper bounds. Note that our results directly apply to individual illegal actions in antitrust enforcement by ignoring the equilibrium condition in our model. Therefore, both individual and group violations with concerted illegal actions are integrated into one unifying framework.
Before we relate our results to the marginal deterrence studied by Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) , we …rst discuss the special case of a constant legal upper bound in our model. 
With these observations in mind, we relate our results to the theory of marginal deterrence in Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) for individual o¤enders and two illegal acts under a constant legal upper bound and a common production of detection and conviction. 7 These references derive that the optimal …ne is non-decreasing in the level of harm in order to induce o¤enders to choose the least harmful act. For antitrust enforcement, illegal acts are represented by a continuum of cartel prices and both the cartel's illegal gains and society's 7 The inspection and prosecution e¤orts of antitrust enforcement are such that a sector must be investigated in order to determine the actual cartel price set. The AA cannot target its activities on speci…c cartel prices beforehand. Therefore, in terms of Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) , the production of antitrust enforcement classi…es as common production of detection and prosecution.
deadweight loss are increasing in the cartel price. Although the optimal …ne schedule is nondecreasing in the cartel price, it is directly related to illegal gains rather than to society's harm. As a thought experiment in terms of two illegal acts under a constant …ne schedule in our model, consider the case p 2 [p; p ) and, for a constant legal upper bound, p that is either the monopoly price or the maximal sustainable cartel price. We have shown that the optimal …ne for p is strictly lower than the …ne for p . For the remaining case p 2 p N ;p and p , the optimal …ne schedule cannot induce the cartel to choose the least harmful act because for such price even the zero …ne is not low enough to provide the proper incentives.
If that case arises in their model, Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) set the …ne equal to the legal upper bound and this is in contrast to the principle of proportionality that would set the …ne equal to zero. Recall that our results directly apply to individual illegal actions by ignoring the equilibrium condition in our model. To summarize, our results indicate how to generalize the results in Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) to the case of a non-constant legal upper bound and both individual and group violations with multiple concerted illegal actions in the context of antitrust enforcement.
Concluding Remarks
We provide a coherent framework to study the economic consequences of legal and economics principles in crime enforcement. Our analysis characterizes the optimal …ne schedule that maximizes social welfare and we show that it coincides with the …ne schedule that minmaxes the cartel's pro…t. This schedule remains below the legal ceiling, except at the cartel price where the minmax cartel pro…t is achieved under this legal ceiling, and there is a range of low cartel prices for which the …ne is set to zero according to the legal lower bound. Hence, the main implication of our analysis is that the antitrust authority should not punish maximally overall, but punish in a smarter manner such that mild o¤enses are not …ned at all. In general, our results call for a subtle reconsideration of the common wisdom in the economics of crime that setting the …ne equal to the available legal upper bound always increases the e¤ectiveness of deterrence.
By either adding or substituting other legal principles, one can easily assess the impact of such principles on the enforced cartel price. Therefore, our approach allows to quantify the economic costs of adapting society's legal principles through the di¤erences in society's deadweight losses. For example, increasing maximum penalties by shifting the legal ceiling upwards decreases the cartel's minmax value, and consequently, reduces the cartel price.
Although the antitrust authority should shrink the range of low cartel prices where it …nes zero and raises the …ne schedule elsewhere, the optimal …ne schedule remains below the legal ceiling almost everywhere. As another example, imposing minimum …nes, a popular call in recent politics, will enable the cartel to set a higher price. Therefore, positive minimum …nes reduce social welfare and should never be imposed or, if they are currently implemented, they should be abolished. Our analysis provides a technique to adequately deal with such modi…cations of legal rules.
Furthermore, in the literature on antitrust enforcement, see Harrington (2010) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) , it is often argued that corporate antitrust …nes are insu¢ cient to successfully deter cartel formation and that the legal upper bounds should be increased.
We agree that increasing the legal upper bound is a right trend in general. But we also show that even in the presence of insu¢ cient legal upper bounds the e¤ectiveness of deterrence can still be improved by reducing …nes for mild o¤ences as our optimal …ne schedule prescribes.
The derived optimal …ne schedule can be related to the literature on marginal deterrence by Stigler (1971 ), Shavell (1992 , and Wilde (1992) . Our analysis shows how to generalize the results in Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) to the case of a non-constant legal upper bound and both individual and group violations with multiple concerted illegal acts in the context of antitrust enforcement.
Finally, our analysis can be easily extended to incorporate the optimal choice of inspection e¤ort. In this case the optimal antitrust enforcement is characterized by a pair of instruments ( ; ) that minimizes dead-weight loss and the social cost of enforcement. We can characterize the optimal antitrust enforcement in two steps; …rst solve the optimal …ne schedule for detection probability , and then solve for the optimal level of the detection probability and the corresponding optimal …ne schedule. Since the minimal optimal cartel price is continuous in , there exists a socially optimal level of inspection e¤orts. (10) and (11) become
Consequently, the sustainable cartel price p would be more pro…table than v and the minimal cartel pricep could not be an optimal cartel price. Hence, any cartel price p 2 ( p; p M ] must be unsustainable and this requires strict inequality.
Condition (14) poses two issues in characterizing the optimal …ne for p 2 ( p; p M ] and resolving these issues distracts attention from the fact that the antitrust authority can secure the minimal cartel pricep. The …rst issue is that the right-hand side of (14) need not be non-decreasing. Within our domain of monotone …ne schedules, the optimal …ne schedule is therefore bounded from below on the interval ( p; p M ] by the monotone function that is the least monotone function that satis…es
The function exists, it is bounded from below by the constant function ( p) 
This …ne schedule satis…es all legal principles and it implements the minimal cartel pricep as the least optimal cartel price.
Unfortunately, the strict inequality in (15) may not hold for all p 2 ( p; p M ], which is the case in the classic Bertrand oligopoly for which opt (p) = n (p), and this causes a second issue namely the least …ne schedule fails as an optimal …ne schedule on the interval
The consequence is that we cannot obey the principle of proportionality on ( p; p M ]. However, if we weaken this principle, the antitrust authority would be able to implement the minimal cartel pricep as the least optimal cartel price within the domain of …ne schedules that obey the other three legal principles. Note, however, that this issue is arti…cial. As is standard in many oligopoly models, we assume that money is perfectly divisible for technical convenience.
In reality, there is a smallest money unit and one can break the equality v(p; ) = opt (p)
by increasing by one smallest money unit. Here, the technical convenience of perfectly divisible money that served us well throughout the analysis turns against our main goal and we regard it as a technical matter of no practical importance. 
each individual …rm gets a pro…t that lies strictly between v and opt (p). Because of the …rst inequality, the upper bound fails the principle of proportionality to deter cartel price p.
Application of our insights to the boundary case v = 0, which would violate condition (4), yieldsp = p = p N and 1 ^ (p) as the optimal …ne schedule on p N ; p M . For this boundary case, all issues discussed in this appendix hold.
To summarize, we regard the non-existence of the optimal …ne schedule that satis…es all four legal principles on p N ; p M as a technical matter of no practical importance. However, independent whether this issue arises, the facts remain that …rst.the antitrust authority can secure the minimal cartel pricep by adopting one of the …ne schedules given by (17) and second, that such …ne schedules satisfy all four legal principles on the interval p N ; p .
